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California License To Be Sued: A Critique of 
Strict Liability Imposed on Business Owner 




Respondeat superior, “piercing the corporate veil,” and strict liability; 
the legal world at times can have the appearance of a mine field for a 
business owner—an appearance which many business owners would likely 
argue is representative of their realities.  With so many legal avenues and 
theories designed to impose liability on business owners, one cannot help 
but ask a number of questions: What purpose do these theories serve? 
What policies do they promote?  And perhaps most importantly, is it really 
necessary to be stacking the deck so heavily against business owners? 
Consumer protection is the overarching goal justifying these theories 
of liability for business owners.  The law assumes that “an [employer] is in 
a position to control the actions of [his or her employees].”1  By holding the 
employers liable, the law seeks to control the employees indirectly.  It 
assumes that employers will be motivated to use their control to ensure that 
their employees will also stay in compliance with the law. 
However, there is no such thing as a free lunch.  The cost of this 
benefit is the potential for business owners to be held liable absent any fault 
whatsoever.  Even the assumption of control can be questioned.  Can we 
really expect business owners to be able to prevent every single bad act of 
every single one of their employees?  What if the employee violates the law 
while acting in good faith, should the employer still be liable?  There are a 
number of concerns that these theories raise; however, even the United 
States Supreme Court has determined the benefits of these theories 
outweigh the costs.  In the famous Park2 case, the Court held the president 
of a food chain criminally liable for rodent contamination in one of the 
* J.D. 2012, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. 
1. Ford Dealers Ass’n v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 32 Cal. 3d 347, 353 n.8 (1982). 
2. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 658 (1975). 
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company warehouses, despite lack of knowledge on the part of the 
president and the fact that he did not even work in the same state as the 
contaminated warehouse. 
This same logic has carried into the field of business owner licensure. 
The courts have taken the same approach to prevent illegal conduct on the 
part of employees, stating “only through imposing liability on the licensee 
can such conduct be effectively controlled.”3  Strict liability for employers 
has been justified by the principle that “the licensee, if he elects to operate 
his business through employees must be responsible to the licensing 
authority for their conduct in the exercise of his license . . . .”4 
However, from the outset a distinction needs to be drawn between 
civil actions brought by a tort plaintiff and disciplinary actions brought by a 
regulatory agency.  This article criticizes strict liability when used in 
disciplinary actions by regulatory agencies.  In terms of tort actions, there 
is a need to make plaintiffs whole that is not present in disciplinary 
actions.5  It makes sense to impose strict liability on business owners in tort 
actions for a couple of key reasons: First, tort plaintiffs often do not have 
the resources to trace fault within a business, making strict liability the only 
method by which a plaintiff can ensure that he or she is made whole; 
Second, business owners are generally the deep pockets and have the 
financial resources, typically through insurance, to make the plaintiff whole 
in tort actions.  The need to make plaintiffs whole justifies imposing strict 
liability in these contexts, and business owners accept this fact by 
purchasing insurance and acknowledging that tort actions are often a cost 
associated with doing business.  Putting tort actions aside, the rest of this 
article zeroes in squarely on imposing strict liability in disciplinary actions. 
When it comes to licensing and disciplinary actions, the stakes are 
raised a bit.  A business license represents someone’s livelihood.  While 
supporters argue that strict liability does protect the public interest, the 
theory has the potential to infringe on an individual’s livelihood absent any 
fault on his or her part whatsoever.  This doctrine has already been applied 
across the spectrum of industries.  As a result of illegal activity on the part 
of employees, licensees have been punished in a number of industries 
ranging from pharmaceutical,6 to alcoholic beverages,7 to car sales,8 to 
3. Ford Dealers Ass’n, 32 Cal. 3d at 362. 
4. Garcia v. Martin, 14 Cal. App. 2d 785, 790 (2002). 
5. See Wisper Corp. v. Cal. Commerce Bank, 49 Cal. App. 4th 948, 969 (1996) (“The primary
purpose of our tort law is to make a plaintiff whole for damages suffered due to tortious actions by 
others.”). 
6. Randle v. Cal. State. Bd. of Pharmacy, 20 Cal. App. 2d 254, 254 (1968). 
7. Garcia, 14 Cal. App. 2d at 786 (holding bar owner liable, including revocation of his license,
for the conduct of his female employees who solicited drinks for themselves from customers). 
8. Rob-Mac, Inc. v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 148 Cal. App. 3d 793, 793 (1983). 
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horse racing9 . . . yes, even horse racing has not been able to evade the mine 
field of strict liability.  The question then becomes whether this is justified. 
Theoretically, at some point the benefit of protecting the public becomes 
overshadowed by the “injustice to an individual whose right to earn his 
livelihood in his chosen profession is lost because it is impossible for him 
to prevent a violation of the [law by his or her employees].”10 
In the criminal law context, courts are extremely hesitant to revoke 
someone’s liberty, so much so that they require a showing of fault “beyond 
a reasonable doubt.”11  Yet the law seems perfectly willing to jeopardize 
someone’s livelihood absent a showing of fault under any standard, much 
less one so high as to require lack of any reasonable doubt.  Agencies have 
a number of punishments at their disposal to punish licenseholders 
including probation, suspension, and, in the worst of cases, revocation of 
licensure.  Courts are comforted by the thought that the punishments are 
generally falling on “big evil corporations,” but that’s not always the case. 
Many of the business owners held strictly liable for the actions of their 
employees are small-business owners who upon punishment may lose their 
only source of livelihood without any direct fault on their part. 
What if there were industries where the courts could direct liability 
solely to the person at fault?  Would it still be appropriate to hold business 
owners liable if fault lies with one of their employees?  In that situation, 
would there even be a benefit to application of the strict liability theory 
against the business owner? 
This article seeks to critique and propose a leash on strict liability, to 
control this seemingly overbroad application of the law.  It will critique the 
theory of strict liability from the perspective of the automotive smog check 
industry, where the law is relatively new and case law is in many areas in 
the early stages of development.  However, the principles set forth can and 
should be applied to a number of industries; some of which, as we will see, 
have already begun limiting strict liability.  Section II will discuss the 
background of the smog check industry and its governing law.  Section III 
will critique the current state of the law and discuss the burdensome effect 
it places on business owners including smog station owners.  Finally, 
Section IV will propose a bright line rule to limit strict liability and more 
effectively pursue public interests. 
9. Sandstorm v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 31 Cal.2d 401, 403 (1948). 
10. Sandstorm, 31 Cal.2d 401, 422 (1948) (Carter, J., dissenting). 
11. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970). 
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II. BACKGROUND: THE SMOG CHECK INDUSTRY AND THE
GOVERNING LAW 
A. THE SMOG CHECK INDUSTRY
Once every two years California car owners get to experience the joys
of the smog check industry while satisfying the requirement of biennial 
smog tests.12  California’s smog check program was created in response to 
the Federal Clean Air Act which Congress passed in 1970 to create 
minimum standards for air quality.13  Falling short of the federal floor for 
air quality, California implemented its smog check program in 1982.14  In 
enacting the program, the Legislature declared “the people of the State of 
California have a primary interest in the quality of the physical 
environment in which they live, and that this physical environment is being 
degraded by the waste and refuse of civilization polluting the 
atmosphere.”15 
Perhaps in shame, perhaps as a challenge to itself, California 
recognized the long road to compliance that lay before it and declared itself 
the most heavily air polluted state in the nation.16  The problem has always 
been obvious—automobiles stand alone as the greatest source of air 
pollution in the state.17  In fact, a very small percentage of automobiles 
cause a disproportionate amount of the air pollution in California.18  
However, while the problem has been identified, the solution has never 
been as readily apparent. 
Showing its commitment to change, California enacted a program 
with the most stringent new car emission standards in the nation and a 
vehicle inspection program that theoretically would result in most cars 
producing very little pollution.19  The program seeks to solve California’s 
air quality problems by ensuring that new cars are designed with emission 
standards in mind and also to ensure that older model cars do not pollute 
12. Does my Car Need a Smog Check?, SMOGTIPS.COM, http://www.smogtips.com/need_inspectio 
n.cfm (last visited Mar. 11, 2011). 
13. California Smog Check Program, SMOGTIPS.COM, http://www.smogtips.com/smog_program.c 
fm (last visited March 11, 2011). 
14. Id. 
15. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39000 (West 2011).
16. Id. at § 44080. 
17. What Is a Gross Polluter Vehicle?, SMOGTIPS.COM, http://www.smogtips.com/gross_
polluter.cfm (last visited Mar. 11, 2011) (“It is estimated that 50% of the smog in the state of California 
is produced by motor vehicles.”). 
18. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44080; Rebecca Kimitch, Cheaper, Tougher Smog Checks
Promise to Reduce Pollution, Supporters Say, WHITTIER DAILY NEWS (California), Oct. 18, 2010 
(“Currently 75 percent of car exhaust pollution comes from 25 percent of cars on the road.”). 
19. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44080. 
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beyond a maximum level.20 
Public participation and awareness have always been additional tools 
the Legislature intended to aid in the program’s success.21  In fact, a public 
information program was created which the legislature intended “to 
develop and maintain public support and cooperation for the motor vehicle 
inspection and maintenance program.”22  The program was designed to 
inform the public about the “damage caused by air pollution . . . [t]he 
contribution of automobiles to air pollution[,] the gross polluter23 
problem[,] . . . the importance of maintaining a vehicle’s emission control 
devices in good working order[,] and the importance of the [smog check] 
program.”24 
Programs, such as the public information program, designed to operate 
within the smog check program as a whole, are funded by the smog check 
program itself.  The state attempts to make the smog check program as self-
reliant as possible by using funds from the Vehicle Inspection and Repair 
Fund.25  The money in the Fund consists of revenue collected from fines 
imposed on licensees.26  Theoretically, as long as there are violators who 
need to be educated, the program will have the money to do so through the 
fines collected by catching those violators. 
While California initially had high hopes for its smog check program, 
the program never quite achieved its aspirations.  Skeptics of the program 
have been quick to report that the program has only reduced emissions by 
half the amount predicted by the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency.27  Through nearly three decades of the program’s existence, 
California has altered it numerous times, sometimes as a result of pressure 
from the EPA,28 in hopes of achieving better results.29  As probably 
20. Amihai Glazer, Daniel B. Klein & Charles Lave, Clean on Paper, Dirty on the Road: Troubles
with California’s Smog Check, 29 J. TRANSP. ECON. & POL’Y, 85, 85 (1995), available at http://www. 
bath.ac.uk/e-journals/jtep/pdf/Volume_XX1X_No_1_85-92.pdf. 
21. See HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44070.5. 
22. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44070.5. 
23. A gross polluter is a car which greatly exceeds the maximum allowed emissions levels (usually
by more than twice the maximum).  What Is a Gross Polluter Vehicle?, supra note 17.  Gross polluters 
represent only ten to fifteen percent of all vehicles, but contribute more than half of automobile-caused 
air pollution.  Id. 
24. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44070.5. 
25. Id. at § 44071. 
26. Id. at § 44062. 
27. Glazer, supra note 20, at 85 (“The US Environmental Protection Agency had estimated that
such a programme could reduce emissions of [hydrocarbon] and [carbon monoxide] by 25 per cent. . . . 
The programme’s effectiveness was, at best, half that predicted.”). 
28. Greg Lucas, EPA Turns Up the Heat on State in Smog-Test War, S.F. CHRONICLE, Jan. 8,
1994; Whatever Happened To Give And Take?: EPA’s Heavy-Handed Tactics In Disagreement On 
Smog Testing Are Riling California Officials, L.A. TIMES, (Jan. 24, 1994), available at www. 
articles.latimes.com /1994-01-24/local/me-14756_1_smog-testing. 
29. See Alex Roth, New Smog Test Kicks In, THE DAILY NEWS OF L.A., (June 9, 1998), available
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expected, these alterations have often had both supporters and opponents 
vehemently debating their expected results on the smog check program as a 
whole.30 
Regardless of the overall effect these program alterations have had on 
California’s smog check program, one problem has haunted the program 
since its inception.  Fraud has been, and continues to be, one of the most 
troublesome problems related to the smog check industry.31  Year after 
year, vehicles are passed despite emission levels well beyond the maximum 
limit.32  One of the ways California has attempted to cut back on fraud has 
been to hold both the technicians and the smog check station owners liable 
for any incidents of fraud, regardless of fault.  The rest of this article seeks 
to critique the State’s use of a  macheteto do the job of a scalpel in 
remedying this admittedly complicated problem. 
B. THE GOVERNING LAW
The smog check industry is governed by the Bureau of Automotive
Repair (“BAR”) which lies within the California Department of Consumer 
Affairs.33  BAR implements and enforces the laws governing the smog 
check industry against licensees in the industry, all in an effort to protect 
consumers.  “Protection of the public” is, and always was, meant to be the 
highest priority for the BAR in “exercising its licensing, regulatory and 
disciplinary functions.”34 
Amidst BAR’s licensing responsibilities is the licensure of smog 
check technicians (individuals who perform the actual smog tests) and 
smog check station owners (individuals who own facilities in which smog 
checks are performed), two distinct types of licenses.  This licensing 
at www.thefreelibrary.com/NEW+SMOG+TEST+KICKS+IN.-a083824822 (discussing the effects of a 
stricter test being implemented in Los Angeles in 1998); Steve Geissinger, Bay Area To Face Tougher 
Smog Test, TRI-VALLEY HERALD (Pleasanton, California), (Sep. 27, 2002) (Governor Davis signs a bill 
in 2002 requiring stricter smog tests); Jeff Rowe, Cash For Clunkers Hurt Some Smog Stations: Federal 
Program Cuts Into Test Business, N. COUNTY TIMES (Escondido, California), (Apr. 14, 2010), 
www.nctimes.com/business/article_afe2801c-ada9-5cd1-865d-3ca3b29482f4.html (discussing the effect 
of the “Cash for Clunkers” program on the smog check industry). 
30. Compare Kimitch, supra note 18 (supporting 2010 law which allows “the smog emitting levels
of new cars to be measured using their on-board diagnostic systems rather than through tailpipe 
emissions”), with Proposed Rule to Scale Back California’s Smog Check, SYSTEMIC FAILURE BLOG 
(Feb. 25, 2010), http://systemicfailure.wordpress.com/2010/02/25/proposed-rule-to-scale-back-califo 
rnias-smog-check. 
31. Margot Roosevelt, “Widespread Fraud” In California’s Smog Test Program, EARTH PROTECT
BLOG (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.earthprotect.com/blogs/widespread-fraud-in-californias-smog-test-
program.html?blogger=plantit. 
32. Id. 
33. BAR Programs, DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF AUTOMOTIVE REPAIR,
http://www.bar.ca.gov/03_BARPrograms/index.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2011). 
34. Automotive Repair Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 9880.3 (West 2011). 
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system and the laws governing the smog check industry were meant to 
“ensure uniform and consistent tests and repairs by all qualified smog 
check technicians and licensed smog check stations throughout the state.”35 
Turning first to smog check station owners, the owner of a smog 
check station must be licensed by BAR to operate that type of business.36  
There are three different types of smog station licenses, the names of which 
are good indicators for what they permit the licensees to do: test-only 
licensure, under which the station may only perform smog tests; repair-
only, under which the station may only perform repairs on vehicles which 
have failed a smog test;37 and test-and-repair, under which the station can 
perform both tests and repairs.38  Each type of license is distinct and 
independent from the others, so the smog station owner has discretion 
about what area of the industry he wants to pursue.39 
The California Legislature has also permitted the implementation of a 
“gold shield” program,40 which BAR has implemented to make the smog 
check program more convenient for consumers.41  The gold shield program 
allows certain licensed smog check stations that meet “higher performance 
standards to provide [additional] services to California consumers.  In 
addition to the regular Smog Check inspection and repair services, Gold 
Shield stations can inspect and certify “Directed Vehicles,” issue 
certificates to ‘Gross Polluters,’ and perform state subsidized repairs 
through the Consumer Assistance Program.”42  However, unless renewed, 
California’s gold shield program is scheduled to end in 2013.43 
Smog station owners must meet a variety of requirements to obtain, 
and preserve, licensure from BAR.  Prior to being granted a license, BAR 
must first inspect and confirm that the potential licensee’s facility complies 
with all the requirements of a licensed smog station.  After the license has 
been granted, BAR also has the power to inspect the facility at any time 
during normal business hours.44  After licensure, the station owner must 
post and keep posted all relevant licenses for his facility as well as the price 
ranges for services offered.45  The owner must also display an identifying 
35. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44036(a).
36. Id. at § 44014(a)-(b). 
37. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44036(b)-(c). 
38. CODE REGS. tit. 16, § 3340.16.5 (2011). 
39. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44014(b),(d)–(e).
40. Id. at §§ 44014.2(a), 44014.4. 
41. Gold Shield Program Fact Sheet, DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF
AUTOMOTIVE REPAIR, http://www.bar.ca.gov/80_BARResources/01_CAP&GoldShield/GoldShield_ 
Stations.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2011). 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. CODE REGS. tit. 16, § 3340.15 (2011). 
45. Id. 
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sign on the outside of his or her facility, the content of which is provided 
by BAR.46 
Record keeping is also an important responsibility of the smog station 
owner.  The owner licensee must keep records related to all transactions 
and also must have those records available for potential inspections by 
BAR.47  Additionally, the owner must keep on-site information related to 
the station’s current emission control system as well as service 
procedures.48 
Finally, the owner licensee is also responsible for complying with a 
number of requirements related to the equipment used at his or her facility. 
There are some nuances in the equipment requirements for test-only 
stations49 as opposed to test-and-repair stations50 because of the different 
equipment used and the different tasks performed at each type of facility. 
However, there are a number of general requirements which apply to all 
types of facilities.51  One such general requirement is that the facility may 
only use original equipment and replacement parts that have been certified 
by BAR.52  Every facility must also use “computerized and tamper-resistant 
testing equipment” to help ensure accurate test results.53 
A breach of any of these duties can put an owner’s license in jeopardy.  
It is his or her responsibility to ensure that each of these requirements is 
met.  As is the case with most industries involving licensure, even with 
compliance, a station license expires “one year from the last day of the 
month in which the license was issued unless renewed.”54  Each year the 
station owner must renew his or her license, which can prompt BAR to 
investigate the compliance of the facility before renewing that license. 
As mentioned, not only must smog tests be performed at licensed 
smog facilities, those tests and any subsequent repairs must be performed 
by licensed smog technicians who are also regulated by BAR.55  “No 
person shall perform, for compensation, tests or repairs of emission control 
devices . . . unless the person performing the test repair is a qualified smog 
check technician.”56 
There are a number of requirements applicants must comply with prior 
to being granted a smog check technician’s license, including those 
46. CODE REGS. tit. 16, § 3340.22. 
47. Id. at § 3340.15(f) (2011). 
48. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44030(b)(3).
49. CODE REGS. tit. 16, § 3340.16(a). 
50. Id. at § 3340.16.5(a).
51. Id. at § 3340.17. 
52. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44036 (b)(1).
53. Id. at § 44030(b)(1).
54. CODE REGS. tit. 16, §3340.10(c). 
55. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44014(a).
56. Id. at § 44032. 
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involving testing and training.57  Similar to smog check stations, 
technicians can only test/repair classes and categories of vehicles for which 
they are deemed qualified by BAR.58  Aspiring technicians must pass the 
tests and perform the training associated with the types of qualifications 
they seek.59  Once granted, a technician’s license is valid for two years60 
before renewal is necessary (as opposed to the station owner’s license 
which expires every year). 
For purposes of this article, the technician’s responsibilities after 
licensure are much more relevant than those before licensure.  A smog 
check technician has a number of responsibilities in a smog check station 
completely distinct from the station owner’s responsibilities.  While the 
station owner provides the equipment, the facilities with which to conduct 
the tests, and the customers, the technician is the one who actually 
performs the tests and repairs. 
Once licensed, each technician is given a license number and access 
code.61  Access codes are assigned by BAR and each is unique to the 
technician to whom it is assigned.62  BAR requires that technicians protect 
the security of their access code.63  In fact, disclosure of a technician’s 
access code requires the technician to immediately contact BAR in order to 
have the access code changed.64 
BAR’s strong policy requiring privacy of access codes is to ensure 
that each smog test can be tracked to the technician who performs it. 
Before performing each and every smog test, a technician is required to 
enter both his license number and access code to gain access into the 
Emissions Inspection System.65  “Each technician is responsible for the 
accuracy of the test.”66  Smog tests are a one person job.  No one, including 
other licensed technicians and the station owner, may assist in performing 
the test. 
While it’s true that the smog check station, not the technician, issues 
the smog check certificate,67 the technician is the only one who certifies 
compliance with all the laws, regulations, and procedures associated with 
57. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE at §§ 44045.5–45.6. 
58. Id. at  §§ 44014(b), (d)–(e).
59. CODE REGS. tit. 16, § 3340.28. 
60. Id. at § 3340.29(e).
61. DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF AUTOMOTIVE REPAIR, SMOG CHECK
INSPECTION PROCEDURES MANUAL, (Aug. 2009) (incorporated by reference in CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 






67. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44010. 
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performing a smog check test.68  Once the technician gives a stamp of 
approval and the certificate is issued, it is impossible to void that 
certificate.69 
The laws governing the smog check industry lay out clear and 
discernable responsibilities for all those involved.  For BAR, the question 
becomes who to hold liable when those laws are not complied with. 
C. LIABILITY FOR LICENSEE, SMOG CHECK STATION OWNERS
It makes sense that a governing agency should have the power to
revoke a license when the licensee shirks his or her responsibilities, but 
should the agency have the power to hold a licensee responsible for the 
violation of another licensee?  Whether you call it respondeat superior, 
piercing the corporate veil, or strict liability, that’s exactly what governing 
agencies have begun to do—hold licensee business owners liable for their 
employees’ conduct absent any fault on the part of the business owner. 
Generally, American law does not impose “individual liability for an 
act which ordinary human care and foresight could not guard against.”70  
Furthermore, “it is also a general principle . . . that a loss from any cause 
purely accidental must rest where it chances to fall.”71  However, above all 
these principles is the notion that statutes may impose obligations and 
responsibilities otherwise not present on individuals in the name of the 
“general welfare of society.”72 
Based on this last principle, in order to protect consumers, BAR, by 
statute, has authority to take disciplinary action against smog station owner 
licensees for the actions of the “licensee, or any partner, officer, or director 
thereof” including the licensee’s employees.73  The statute specifically 
authorizes BAR to take disciplinary action against a smog station owner if 
any of the owner’s employees, including the smog check technicians, 
violate any of the laws governing the smog check industry, is convicted of 
a crime substantially related to the qualifications necessary to perform the 
work, commits any act involving dishonesty, fraud, or deceit whereby 
another is injured, or attempts to violate the law.74  This type of authority 
can be found in other industries as well.  The laws governing the smog 
68. SMOG CHECK INSPECTION PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 61, at 26. 
69. Id. at 3.
70. Sandstorm v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 31 Cal.2d 401, 406 (1948) (quoting City of Chicago v.
Sturges, 222 U.S. 313, 322 (1911)). 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44072.2; see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 9889.3 (2011)
(containing similar language). 
74. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44072.2; see also BUS. & PROF. CODE § 9889.3 (containing similar
language). 
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check industry are not alone in granting this type of authority to agencies.75  
For example, the Board of Pharmacy has authority to hold pharmacy 
owners liable for the actions of pharmacists,76 the Department of Motor 
Vehicles has authority to hold car dealership owners liable for the actions 
of their car salespersons,77 and the Department of Alcoholic Beverage 
Control has authority to hold bar owners liable for the actions of their 
bartenders.78 
A fraudulent certification of a polluting vehicle is one of the most 
serious violations of smog check law.  Despite the fact that the technicians 
are the ones who perform the test, a smog station owner’s license can be 
revoked if the owner’s station fraudulently certifies a vehicle which his or 
her technician approved for certification.79  A smog station owner must also 
be wary of contracting work out because he or she can even be liable for 
the performance of independent contractors.80 
The result of all these legal avenues leading to liability for smog 
station owners is that an owner can be punished without having 
intentionally or negligently violated any law or regulation governing the 
industry.  As punishment, BAR can impose a variety of sanctions against 
the smog station owner’s license, including imposing probation upon terms 
and conditions set forth by BAR, suspending the license, or revoking the 
license.81  Generally, after suspension of a license, BAR “may reinstate the 
license upon proof of compliance by the applicant with all provisions of the 
decision as to reinstatement.”82  However, after revocation of a license, the 
license cannot be reinstated or reissued for at least one year after the 
effective date of revocation.83  If the misconduct involves a fraudulent 
certification, revocation is permanent, and “the license cannot be reinstated 
for any reason.”84 
Rest assured, there are some restraints on BAR’s ability to impose 
punishments.  By statute, BAR is required to consider a number of factors 
in deciding how severe a penalty to impose, including the seriousness of 
the violation, the good faith of the violator, and any history of previous 
75. See BUS. & PROF. CODE § 9884.7(a) (“The director . . . may deny, suspend, revoke, or place on
probation the registration of an automotive repair dealer for any of the following acts or omissions 
related to the conduct of the business of the automotive repair dealer, which are done by the automotive 
repair dealer or any automotive technician, employee, partner, officer, or member of the automotive 
repair dealer.” (emphasis added)). 
76. See Randle v. Cal. State. Bd. of Pharmacy, 20 Cal. App. 2d 254, 261 (1968). 
77. See Rob-Mac, Inc. v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 148 Cal. App. 3d 793, 799 (1983). 
78. See Garcia v. Martin, 14 Cal. App. 2d 785, 788 (2002). 
79. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44072.10(c);  CODE REGS. tit. 16, § 3340.24 (2011). 
80. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 9884.9(b) (2011). 
81. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44072.4. 
82. Id. at §44072.9. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at § 44072.10(d).
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violations.85  This helps to ensure uniform punishments for similar 
violations.86  Even so, with this kind of power, often the easiest thing for 
the agency to do is to punish anyone and everyone involved regardless of 
who may actually be at fault.87 
Among the multitude of cases demonstrating the strict liability theory 
of punishing business owner licensees, Rob-Mac, Inc. v. Department of 
Motor Vehicles is illustrative.88  There, the DMV imposed probation on 
Rob-Mac’s automobile dealer license for the action of its employee.  The 
President of Rob-Mac had entered into a business agreement with an 
individual named Barry Litsey.89  Rob-Mac provided funds to Litsey who 
then purchased vehicles and sold them wholesale to dealers, the profits of 
which were to be split 50/50.90  On one particular occasion, Litsey 
purchased seven vehicles which he later discovered had reset odometers (in 
violation of the law).  Litsey proceeded to sell the vehicles anyway, without 
telling the buyers or Rob-Mac.91  Upon hearing of the reset odometers, the 
President of Rob-Mac informed the buyers and even ordered a refund for 
one of the cars (it is unclear as to why all seven cars were not refunded).92  
Despite Rob-Mac’s good faith effort to rectify the situation the court and 
BAR held the company president liable.93  The court reasoned it was not 
unfair to impose punishment because there was no evidence Rob-Mac had 
taken affirmative steps to prevent the violation from occurring and the 
public interest in the matter justified any unfairness.94  It’s interesting to 
note that the court did not provide any advice or examples of steps that 
could and should have been taken by Rob-Mac, nor does it give any 
explanation whatsoever as to why Rob-Mac should have suspected any 
illegal conduct on the part of its employee. 
This seemingly unfair result has been justified time and again by the 
principle that “the licensee, if he elects to operate his business through 
employees must be responsible to the licensing authority for their conduct 
in the exercise of his license . . . .  By virtue of the ownership of a . . . 
license such owner has a responsibility to see to it that the license is not 
85. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 44050(b), 44056. 
86. See DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF AUTOMOTIVE REPAIR, GUIDELINES
FOR DISCIPLINARY PENALTIES AND TERMS OF PROBATION (2010), available at http://www.bar.ca.gov/ 
80_BARResources/09_Enforcement/Disciplinary_Penalties_Pt_1.html (providing framework for 
penalties in order to “foster uniformity”). 
87. See Setliff Bros. Serv. v. Bureau of Auto. Repair, 53 Cal. App. 4th 1491, 1494–95 (1997)
(BAR revoked business license of smog station owner as well as licenses of employees). 
88. See Rob-Mac, Inc. v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 148 Cal. App. 3d 793, 799 (1983). 




93. Id. at 800.
94. Id. at 799–800. 
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used in violation of the law.”95  The employer shall be liable even though  
he or she “did not authorize [the employee’s actions] and did not have 
actual knowledge of the activities.”96 
Courts have reasoned that if business owners were correct in arguing 
they should not be held liable for the actions of their employees, “effective 
regulation would be impossible.  [The employer] could contract away the 
daily operations of his business to independent contractors [or employees] 
and become immune to disciplinary action by the licensing authority.”97  
Moreover, there are some business entities, subject to agency regulations, 
that can only act through agents and employees.98  “Thus to speak of the 
‘liability of the licensee’ without referring to the liability of the licensee’s 
employees and agents would often be a meaningless abstraction and would 
make the enforcement of administrative regulations a virtual 
impossibility.”99 
At the most basic level, we can see that what the agency has done is 
delegate some of its regulatory responsibilities to the employer.  However, 
this delegation appears to be acceptable to the courts.  As one court stated, 
“[l]egislation for regulatory purposes, which dispenses with the condition 
of awareness of wrongdoing and places the burden of acting at his peril on 
a person otherwise innocent ‘but standing in personal relation to a public 
danger’ . . . is a traditional means of regulation.”100 
For those still uncomfortable with the notion that a licenseholder can 
be punished without any fault whatsoever, the courts are quick to point out 
that licensure is a privilege.  “Any smog check station or technician’s 
license granted by the department is a privilege and not a vested right.”101  
Courts have applied this principle to justify punishments against all types 
of licenses.102 
But, regardless of licensing’s status as a right rather than a privilege, 
there are those who have not felt comfortable with the state of the law— 
imposing strict liability on licensee business owners.  Is it really fair to hold 
a smog station owner liable for the acts of the employed technicians? 
95. Ford Dealers Ass’n v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 32 Cal. 3d 347, 352 (1982) (quoting Cornell v.
Reilly, 127 Cal. App. 2d 178, 186-87 (1954)). 
96. Randle v. Cal. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 20 Cal. App. 2d 254, 261 (1968) (citing Presto v.
Alcoholic Beverage Etc. Appeals Bd., 179 Cal. App. 2d 262, 265 (1960)). 
97. Camacho v. Youde, 95 Cal. App. 3d 161, 163 (1979). 
98. Cal. Ass’n of Health Facilities v. Dep’t of Health Serv., 16 Cal. 4th 284, 291 (1997). 
99. Cal. Ass’n of Health Facilities, 16 Cal. 4th 284, 291 (1997). 
100. Sandstorm v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 31 Cal.2d 401, 406 (1948 )(quoting People v. Scott, 24
Cal.2d 774, 782 (1944)). 
101. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44072.11. 
102. Garcia v. Martin, 14 Cal. App. 2d 785, 788 (2002). (“[T]here is no inherent right in a citizen to
sell intoxicants . . . and a license to do so is not a proprietary right . . . . It is but a permit to do what 
would otherwise be unlawful.” (quoting State Bd. of Equalization v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. App. 2d 
374, 377 (1935))). 
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Protection of the public is a worthy goal, but does it justify such an unfair 
result?  Is the current system even the best way to pursue that goal? 
III. OVERBURDENSOME AND INEFFICIENT
As explained in the previous section, the majority of judges and courts 
approve, or at least follow, the strict liability theory for business owner 
licensees; however, there are just enough court opinions and dissenters 
going against the grain that a faint cry alleging “Injustice!” can be heard in 
the background.  For example, in the California Supreme Court one justice 
expressed his disgust with this seemingly unjust application of the law: 
“[the law], as here applied, violates every precept of justice as established 
by the Constitution and laws of the United States and this state.  It is 
unconstitutional and out of harmony with the American system of justice, 
and may appropriately be labeled as ‘un-American.’”103  The American 
system of justice has always been based on a pursuit of fairness; however: 
Under this rule an innocent person may be condemned and punished 
without evidence that he did, or intended to do, or permitted to be done, 
any wrong whatsoever.  In fact, this result could be obtained even if it 
were conclusively shown that such innocent person did everything 
possible to prevent the violation of such rule or was overpowered by a 
wrongdoer and rendered helpless while the unlawful act was being 
consummated. . . .  The suspended axe falls and the innocent victim is 
decapitated.  “Oh! [justice], what crimes are committed in thy name.104 
Before deciding whether to offer a stamp of approval versus a label of 
“un-American,” it makes sense to uncover the goals and reasoning behind 
the imposition of strict liability on business owners, such as smog station 
owners, for the conduct of their employees.  The obvious goal is protection 
of consumers—to ensure that a licensee does not “[exercise] his privilege 
in derogation of the public interest.”105 
Once a violation has occurred, “the purpose of the proceeding is to 
determine the fitness of the licensee to continue in that capacity and thus to 
protect society by removing, either temporarily or permanently, from the 
licensed business or profession, a licensee whose methods of conducting 
his business indicate a lack of those qualities which the law demands.”106  
The goal is to protect consumers from “incompetent practitioners.”107  The 
proceeding is not meant “to punish but to afford protection to the public 
103. Sandstorm v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 31 Cal.2d 401, 406 (1948) (Carter, J., dissenting). 
104. Sandstorm, 31 Cal.2d 401, 409 (1948) (Edmonds, J., concurring) (alteration in original).
105. Camacho v. Youde, 95 Cal. App. 3d 161, 163 (1979). 
106. W. Coast Home Improvement Co., Inc. v. Contractor’s State License Bd., 72 Cal. App. 2d 287,
295 (1945). 
107. Fahmy v. Med. Bd. of Cal., 38 Cal. App. 4th 810, 814 (1995). 
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upon the rationale that respect and confidence of the public is merited by 
eliminating from the ranks of practitioners those who are dishonest, 
immoral, disreputable, or incompetent.”108 
Even applying these commendable principles, it is difficult to 
conceive how a smog station owner who is neither negligent nor 
intentionally shirks his or her responsibilities can be considered a danger to 
the public merely because as an employer he happened to hire an employee 
who eventually would violate the law.109  The fact that a smog check 
technician fails to fulfill his or her responsibilities under the law is not 
necessarily indicative that the smog check station owner has also failed his 
or her responsibilities.  Courts should always keep in mind that imposition 
of strict liability affects a licensee’s chosen method of livelihood.  It is 
difficult to justify this type of  encroachment absent a showing of even 
negligence. 
Courts try to justify imposing strict liability to the business owner 
licensee “based on the assumption that a licensed [employer] is in a 
position to control the actions of [his or her employees].”110  But is this 
assumption really justifiable?  After all, theoretically there are at least a few 
employees out there who will intentionally violate the laws.  Admittedly 
there may be some negligence on the part of the employer who hires an 
employee with a history of violations, but there always has to be a first 
time.  The imposition of strict liability becomes a game of Russian roulette 
where the lucky winner (or loser) is the one who unfortunately hires the 
“bad” employee before that employee has any record of illegal conduct. 
The legal system becomes nothing more than a game of chance. 
This is especially true in industries like the smog check industry where 
the employer must be separated from the work of his or her employees.  In 
the smog check industry, the smog station owner cannot help the technician 
perform the tests.  In fact, it would be illegal for him or her to do so.  Only 
the technician who has signed into the Emission Inspection System via his 
license number and access code may perform the test.111  And yet, the 
employer will be liable if the test is not performed correctly, even though 
he or she may have provided an adequate environment and adequate 
108. Borror v. Dep’t of Inv., 15 Cal. App. 3d 531, 535 (1971). 
109. See Sandstorm v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 31 Cal.2d 401, 416 (1948) (Carter, J., dissenting)
(arguing against the majority’s imposition of strict liability on a licensed horse trainer, “It is difficult to 
understand how a trainer who is neither negligent nor intentionally a wrongdoer can be said to lack 
qualifications to be a trainer—to be a danger to the public—merely because he happened to be a trainer 
when a horse was doped through no fault of his or by some one over whom he had no control 
whatsoever.”). 
110. Ford Dealers Ass’n v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 32 Cal. 3d 347, 353 (1982).
111. DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF AUTOMOTIVE REPAIR, SMOG CHECK
INSPECTION PROCEDURES MANUAL (Aug. 2009) (incorporated by reference in CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 16, 
§ 3340.45). 
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equipment to perform the test. 
Moreover, employees are humans just like the rest of us.  They make 
mistakes just like the rest of us, despite good faith effort on the part of 
everyone involved.112  “In such a case there is nothing an employer can do 
to protect himself, as the act of the employee is one which depends entirely 
upon use of his own faculties and senses and it is impossible for the 
employer to determine with any degree of accuracy whether the faculties 
and senses of the employee are functioning properly and accurately during 
all his working hours.”113  The imposition of strict liability “deprives the 
licensee in question of any possible defense.”114 
Furthermore, the overarching goal of this whole system is protection 
of the consumers; however, there is no evidence that the imposition of strict 
liability actually supports this goal.  If an employer completely lacks 
control to prevent a violation by one of his or her employees, how can it be 
said that imposing liability on him or her will prevent future similar 
violations?  If a smog check station owner complies with all of his or her 
responsibilities in providing equipment and facilities so that a technician 
can properly perform a test, what goal could possibly be served by 
imposing liability on the owner?  What would we tell him or her to do 
differently?  Surely, there has to be a way to avoid liability for those 
willing to make a concentrated effort to do so. 
What is even more alarming is the fact that this game of chance, as to 
whether an employer has hired the wrong employee or will have an 
employee make a mistake, can actually result in revocation of licensure—a 
loss of someone’s livelihood, just like that, without any fault whatsoever. 
A number of statutes explicitly allow for revocation of licensure,115 despite 
the seriousness of revocation as a punishment.116  Even courts imposing 
strict liability have been willing to concede that license revocation is “the 
imposition of the most severe administrative penalty possible.”117 
112. It should be noted that the law is designed to have mercy in punishing the good faith errors of
smog check technicians.  “Whenever the department determines, through investigation, that a 
previously qualified smog check technician may lack the skills to reliably and accurately perform the 
test or repair functions within the required qualification, the department may prescribe for the 
technician one or more retraining courses which have been certified by the department . . . .  Upon a 
later completion of the prescribed department certified retraining course, the department may reinstate 
the smog check technician’s qualification.”  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44031.5(c) (2002).  
Rather than unfairly punishing the smog station owner, the courts should be inclined to push for 
retraining of the technicians.  Once again, this seems to better support the overall goal of protecting the 
public because the result is better trained technicians. 
113. In Re Marley, 39 Cal. 2d 525, 532 (1946) (Carter, J., dissenting). 
114. Sandstorm v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 31 Cal.2d 401, 406 (1948 ) (Carter, J., dissenting). 
115. Ford Dealers Ass’n v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 32 Cal. 3d 347, 352 (1982).
116. Id. at 351.
117. Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 62 Cal. 2d 589, 595 (1965) (reversing the
agency’s decision to revoke licensure because revocation was too strict a penalty). 
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While the courts have sought comfort in the assurance that the strictest 
penalties are reserved for the most serious violators, any penalty that is 
undeserved is unfair.  An unjust result is no more acceptable simply 
because it is only a little unjust, or not as unjust as it could have been. 
Moreover, more likely than not, smog check station owners would be 
unwilling to concede that undeserved penalties less than revocation are 
“only a little unjust.” 
Even assuming a small penalty such as a citation is imposed, this may 
have a greater impact than suspected.  Under the California Public Records 
Act,118 the public has access to all citations issued to smog check stations.119  
The purpose of this access is to warn consumers about stations that have 
been disciplined by BAR, and if that goal is realized, a public citation will 
likely result in the loss of potential customers. 
In the current economic recession many small businesses, such as 
smog stations, cannot afford to miss out on any potential customers.  Small 
businesses are the stalwart of the state’s employment opportunities.120  
They make up 99.2% of the state’s employers and provide 51.6% of 
California’s private sector jobs,121 and yet, many of the state’s small 
business owners do not expect to be in business in California beyond the 
recession.122  Small businesses generally do not have the extra resources to 
afford missing out on potential customers, or taking the hit of a public 
citation.  From the outset, small businesses have a tougher time and bear a 
heavier financial burden to meet regulatory requirements than do larger 
businesses with more resources.123  Strict liability standards against small 
business owners will not only jeopardize their survival, but will cost the 
state jobs, resulting in increased unemployment,124 and a blow to 
competition within the industry.125 
 Even the courts which take comfort in the notion that licensing is a 
privilege may be making an unwarranted assumption.  Licensing was not 
always viewed as a privilege that could be taken away without fault.  A 
number of courts before the 1940s openly acknowledged licensing as a 
118. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 6250–70. 
119. Inquire Before You Hire!, DEPT. OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF AUTOMOTIVE REPAIR,
http://www.inquirebeforeyouhire.ca.gov (last visited Mar. 12, 2011). 
120. U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Small Business
Profile: California, (2011), available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/ca10.pdf. 
121. Id. 
122. Jan Norman, Are California Firms Closing or Leaving?, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, (Mar. 8,
2011, 1:15 PM), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/california-291073-small-business.html. 
123. Nicole V. Crain & W. Mark Crain, U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF
ADVOCACY, The Impact of Regulatory Costs on Small Firms, (Sep. 2010), available at 
http://www.sba.gov/advocacy/853/2016. 
124. Calif. Unemployment Rate Dips Slightly In January, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, (Mar. 4,
2011), available at http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9LOJM900.htm. 
125. Belsinger v. District of Columbia, 436 F.2d 214, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
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property right.  In the context of medical licensing, a court noted “[t]he 
right to practice medicine, once granted, becomes a property right which 
cannot be taken away except for reasons which supply at least some 
reasonable grounds for believing that the one who has been licensed is no 
longer fit to continue in the practice.”126  “The right to practice medicine is, 
like the right to practice any other profession, a valuable property right, in 
which, under the constitution and laws of the state, one is entitled to be 
protected and secured.”127  Even as recently as 1990, courts have discussed 
licensing as a right.  Licensing cases “have distinguished between the 
denial of an application for a license (nonvested right) and the suspension 
or revocation of an existing license (vested right).  Once an agency has 
exercised its expertise and issued a license, the agency’s subsequent 
revocation of that license . . . affects a vested right.”128 
While there are of course a number of incentives cited by enforcement 
bodies to impose strict liability standards, courts and agencies have an 
incentive to preserve strict liability because it makes their lives easy.  It is 
much easier to go straight to the top and always have someone to hold 
accountable rather than work to uncover who is actually at fault, and this is 
exactly what has occurred.  For example, the D.C. Circuit criticized the 
Electrical Board for its laziness in imposing punishment against the 
personal license of a business owner, rather than the employees who 
violated the law and the corporation itself. 
The Electrical Board has taken no action whatsoever against the 
employees of the Maintenance Corporation who made such installation, 
nor against the Maintenance Corporation itself.  For all this record 
shows, the Maintenance Corporation and the persons doing the 
unauthorized acts are perfectly free to continue the same . . . .  In its 
misplaced zeal the Board wound up imposing a penalty against an 
individual who . . . was not responsible for the acts complained of . . . 
while the demonstrated miscreants go scot free.129 
Respondeat superior, piercing the corporate veil, and strict liability, it 
is clear these legal principles have worn out their welcome; stretched and 
forced into areas of the law they do not belong.  As the D.C. Circuit 
cleverly put it, “a moment’s reflection shows that if, indeed, [piercing the 
corporate veil] was the basis for the Board’s action, the wrong corporate 
veil was pierced.  Hamlet illustrates the danger of piercing curtains.  At 
least Shakespeare’s character had the right curtain, although he stabbed the 
wrong man; here the [Board], while sure in its own mind of its mark, 
126. Barrett v. Bd. of Osteopathic Exam’rs, 4 Cal. App. 2d 135, 139 (1935). 
127. Hewitt v. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 148 Cal. 590, 593 (1906). 
128. Clerici v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 224 Cal. App. 3d 1016, 1023 (1990). 
129. Belsinger, 436 F.2d at 218. 
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pierced the wrong veil and invoked the wrong remedy against the wrong 
victim.”130 
IV. A PROPOSAL: FAULT AND LIABILITY, TOGETHER AGAIN
There is no doubt that strict liability is imposed to protect the interests
of the public; “but not everything done ‘in the interest of the public is valid 
for that reason.’”131  Moreover, the imposition of strict liability on a smog 
station owner does not protect the interests of the public because absent at 
least a showing of negligence, it does not motivate (nor should it) the 
licensee to behave any differently than he or she did the first time.  This 
system imposes a burden on smog station owners while there is no benefit 
to the owners, the public, or anyone else to offset that burden.  It is a cost-
benefit balance, but all of the weight has fallen on one side of the scale. 
The smog check industry is one where both the employer and the 
employee are licensed.  They both hold separate and distinct licenses.  In 
that context, the agency has the luxury of punishing the licenseholder who 
is actually at fault.  There are several industries where only the employer is 
licensed.  There are also a number of industries where the employer does 
not have separate responsibilities beyond those of the employees’ 
responsibilities; where “the only way in which [the employer] can act is 
through the individuals who act on its behalf.”132  Admittedly in those 
contexts a strict liability regime makes more sense because the agency 
cannot impose punishment against employees’ licenses that do not exist.133 
Even in those contexts, there are some potential issues with fairness; 
however, that battle is for another day and another article.  As a starting 
point, we must begin to scale back strict liability in those areas that are 
most unfair.  The imposition of strict liability should be prohibited where 
both employer and employee are licensed, such as in the case of the smog 
check industry.  The courts should only impose liability on the business 
owner if there is a showing of fault or at least negligence.  Instead 
punishments should be directed at the licenseholder who is at fault, and 
only the licenseholder who is at fault. 
The public interest would be better protected under this regime. 
Rather than being tempted to take the “easy way out” and impose liability 
through strict liability, agencies like BAR will be forced to focus their 
attention on the actual violators.  The violators themselves are the ones in 
130. Belsinger, 436 F.2d at 221. 
131. Sandstorm v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 31 Cal.2d 401, 406 (1948)  (Edmonds, J., concurring)
(citing McFarland v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1916)). 
132. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 668 (1975) (quoting United States v. Dotterweich 320
U.S. 277, 281 (1943)). 
133. Arenstein v. Cal. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 265 Cal. App. 2d 179, 182 (1968). 
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need of motivation to alter their behavior and the best way to do that is 
through direct punishment, rather than indirect punishment through the 
employer. 
Courts have also been concerned with the idea that employers will be 
completely immune if they can hide behind their employees; however, that 
concern is not applicable in many industries including the smog check 
industry.  As discussed, there are a number of responsibilities that fall 
squarely and solely in the lap of the smog station owner and vice versa with 
the smog check technicians.  For example, a faulty certification could be 
due to inadequate equipment, suggesting liability on the employer, or due 
to bad faith on the part of the technician, in which case only the technician 
should be liable. 
Even in situations where the California Supreme Court has imposed 
strict liability on employers, the court has hinted at the unfairness of the 
doctrine’s application in this context.  In dictum the court stated “where [an 
employer] is able to demonstrate unusual circumstances that negate the 
presumption of control, it might be unfair to hold that [employer] liable for 
the [actions of his or her employees].”134  The court has been willing to 
concede the necessary scaling back of the rule, but has not yet motivated 
itself to do exactly that.  The court has briefly discussed what types of 
“unusual circumstances” would suffice: “[m]ere lack of knowledge would 
not suffice . . . .  [An employer] might be able to defend against an action . . . 
by demonstrating that it made every effort to discourage [the violating 
actions]; had no knowledge of [the actions]; and, when so informed, 
refused to accept the benefits of [those actions].” 135  However, the court 
was quick to abandon the responsibility of fully developing an exception, 
declaring “the court need not decide the exact dimensions of a possible 
exception to that general rule.”136 
The court is making the task more difficult than it has to be.  A simple, 
easy to apply, bright-line rule would be to prohibit the imposition of strict 
liability on an employer absent a showing of fault, if the actual violator 
employee can instead be held liable.  For no apparent reason, one 
California court abandoned the general rule of strict liability and indeed 
adopted this exact reasoning without ever stating an actual rule. 
In contrast with the Rob-Mac case discussed in the previous section, 
California should shift gears and head in the direction the court wandered 
into in Hansell v. Santos Robinson Mortuary.137  In Hansell, the defendant, 
Santos Mortuary, was a licensed funeral director.138  Santos was hired by a 
134. Ford Dealers Ass’n v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 32 Cal. 3d 347, 353 (1982).
135. Ford Dealers Ass’n, 32 Cal. 3d 347, 353 (1982). 
136. Id.
137. Hansell v. Santos Robinson Mortuary, 64 Cal. App. 4th 608, 608 (1998). 
138. Id. at 612.
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number of families to perform services related to caring for decedents 
including removal of the body from the place of death, preparation of the 
body, preparation of memorial services, completion of certificates and 
permits, and arrangements for the cremation of the bodies.139  Santos 
contracted out the cremation duties to a licensed crematory, Pleasant 
Hill.140  Santos itself was not licensed to perform the crematory services 
and thus it would have been illegal for it to have performed those services. 
It was discovered later on that the crematory, Pleasant Hill, violated a 
number of laws when conducting the cremations including performing 
multiple cremations in the same chamber at the same time.141  The issue 
before the court was whether Santos could be held liable for the 
crematory’s actions. 
The court refused to hold Santos liable when “the undisputed fact is 
that defendant mortuaries did not themselves violate the statute.  They did 
not perform any crematory act, nor were they licensed to do so.”142  The 
court noted that “cremation activity is a separately licensed activity in 
which non-licensed persons, such as funeral directors, have no say.”143  
Similar to the situation with smog station owners, Santos did not even have 
a right to oversee the cremation activities and it would have been illegal for 
Santos to have performed the cremations itself.144  The court also refuted 
the idea that Santos was completely immune.  The mortuary had a number 
of duties to perform, potentially including a duty to use care in selecting 
which crematory to hire.145  Santos could and would have been liable if it 
had not complied with any of those duties; however, imposition of liability 
for a duty largely out of the control of the mortuary was unacceptable. 
The principles used by the court in the Hansell case support a bright 
line rule limiting liability and should be expressly and fully adopted in the 
California legal system.  The rule ensures a more focused and more 
effective pursuit of the public interest by targeting those who are actually at 
fault and either forcing those individuals to change or preventing them 
from further harming consumers.  Moreover, it eliminates the unnecessary 
and excessive burdens currently imposed on business owners.  Removing 
innocent, law abiding licensees from the industry only hurts the industry. 
139. Hansell, 64 Cal. App. 4th  at 612. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 613.
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 612.
145. Id. at 616.  See also 35 Cal. Jur. 3d Funeral Directors and Embalmers § 11 (“Once a mortuary
has exercised due care in contracting for cremation services by a licensed facility, the mortuary should 
be entitled to rely upon the crematory for the proper performance of cremation activities.”). 
 
494 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 8:2 
V. CONCLUSION
Protection of the public is a worthy goal of the American legal system, 
very few would dispute that.  However, the courts and legislators should be 
careful not to arbitrarily impose costs and burdens in the name of the public 
interest when those burdens are excessive, and especially when those 
burdens are not the most effective way to actually protect the public.  This 
arbitrary application of the runaway strict liability doctrine is exactly what 
has leaked into the American legal system.  The courts and legislators need 
to take a second, and third, look, if necessary, to answer the question 
whether the law, as is, represents the best policy for protecting the public or 
whether it is better described as lawmakers taking the “easy way out.”  The 
courts have exchanged their sharp shooting rifles, perfect for pinpointing 
liability on the guilty, for a handful of grenades which punish anyone left at 
the scene of the crime, both innocent and guilty alike. 
“Oh! [public interest], what crimes are committed in thy name.” 
